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ELECTING DELEGATES TO A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION:
SOME LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
Richard Briffault*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2004, then-Governor James E. McGreevey signed into law a
measure intended to address one of New Jersey's most contentious and
explosive issues, the property tax. The law called for the creation of the
Property Tax Convention Task Force (the "Task Force") to develop
recommendations concerning the design of a state constitutional convention
for revamping the existing property tax system.' In addition to analyzing the
scope, operation, and timing of a property tax convention, one of the
principal tasks of the Task Force was to determine the method for the
election of delegates. The New Jersey Constitution is utterly silent on the
question of how delegates to a state constitutional convention should be
chosen. Consequently, the Task Force had broad discretion in framing its
recommendations.
This Article grows out of a paper prepared for the Task Force in October
2004 on the question of delegate selection. Part II considers the limits and
requirements placed on delegate selection by the United States Constitution
and the Federal Voting Rights Act.2 Federal law protects both the right to
vote and the equal representation of voters, and the vote dilution doctrine
under the Votin Rights Act provides particular protection for the rights of
minority voters. Beyond the question of what the law requires or forbids,
there are considerable opportunities to broaden the representation of
minorities, including political as well as racial minorities. Part III describes a
number of alternative voting systems that are relatively uncommon, but not
unknown, that can be used to make multi-member elected bodies more
representative.
Ultimately, on December 31, 2004, the Task Force opted not to adopt an
alternative voting system, but instead made two recommendations, both of
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
I. 2004 N.J. Laws 883-85.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
3. See id.
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which built off the state's current forty legislative districts. Under one
proposal, eighty delegates would be elected, two from each district, with the
Governor and the state legislative leaders then selecting an additional ten
delegates with the goal of promoting demographic diversity.4 The other
proposal recommended the election of 120 delegates, three from each
district.5 In May 2005, the New Jersey Assembly passed a bill authorizing a
property tax convention that embraced the Task Force's first delegate
selection recommendation.6 In Part IV, I briefly discuss the Task Force's
recommendations.
In July 2005, Acting Governor Richard Codey shut down the
constitutional revision process for 2005, saying he believed the matter should
be left to the next governor and legislature. Accordingly, the analysis of
delegate selection issues in this Article should be relevant to future
deliberations concerning a state constitutional convention in New Jersey and
in other states.
I1. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND VOTING RIGHTS ACT ISSUES IN THE
ELECTION OF DELEGATES TO A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The decision to fill any public office by election ordinarily raises several
legal questions: Who is eligible to vote for the office? How shall the seats be
allocated across a jurisdiction for a multi-member body? And does the
allocation scheme unduly burden the rights of minorities?
The right to vote question is largely a matter of constitutional law. The
questions of how to allocate seats and how to protect minority rights involve
both constitutional and statutory concerns. Particularly important is the
Federal Voting Rights Act, which addresses the voting and representation
rights of racial and language minorities.
8
4. STATE OF N.J., REPORT OF THE PROPERTY TAX CONVENTION TASK FORCE
CONVENTION, A PLAN TO HOLD A PROPERTY TAX CONVENTION: "FINDING A FAIRER SYSTEM,"
7-8 (Dec. 3 1, 2004) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
5. Id. at 8. The delegates would presumably be elected on at-large basis, although the
report does not clearly spell that out.
6. Assemb. 5269, 211th Leg., 15-16 (N.J. 2005).
7. Tom Hester, Codey Tosses Convention Proposal to Successor, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, July 13, 2005, at 13.
8. See 42. U.S.C. § 1973.
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A. Constitutional Issues
1. The Right to Vote
There is surprisingly little federal constitutional law concerning the
selection of delegates to a state constitutional convention. For example, there
is no requirement that a state select its constitutional convention delegates by
popular election. However, under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, should a state decide to submit the selection of
delegates to popular vote, then any restrictions on the franchise would be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Presumptively, any person eligible to vote
in New Jersey elections would be entitled to vote in an election for
constitutional convention delegates. 9 Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment's
prohibition on racial discrimination in voting would also apply.
2. One Person, One Vote
Most elections for public office are subject to the constitutional
requirement of one person, one vote, so that if a jurisdiction is divided into
districts for the election of representatives, each representative must
represent an equal number of voters.' ° Oddly, it is not clear whether the one
person, one vote doctrine applies to the election of constitutional convention
delegates. Three decisions, two by state supreme courts and one by a federal
district court, held that one person, one vote does not apply to the election of
convention delegates, on the theory that a constitutional convention is not a
governing body, but simply a recommendatory body whose "only authority
... is to propose amendments to be submitted to a vote of the people of the
State at large."" Moreover, one of those decisions was affirmed by the
Supreme Court without opinion.' 2 On the other hand, one federal court of
appeals has held that the question of whether "one person, one vote" applies
9. Cf Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a Missouri
law limiting to freeholders the right to serve on a board empowered to propose to the voters a
local government reorganization plan).
10. See Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political
equality... can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.").
11. Livingston v. Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d 138, 145 (I1. 1969); accord Driskell v. Edwards,
413 F. Supp. 974, 977 (W.D. La. 1976), affd, 425 U.S. 956 (1976); Stander v. Kelley, 250
A.2d 474, 481 (Pa. 1969).
12. Driskell, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
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is not "constitutionally insubstantial,"' 3 and the New Jersey Supreme Court,
at the dawn of the one person, one vote era, assumed that if a constitutional
convention were called, counties could be used as the basis for the election
of delegates provided representation was proportionate to county
population.'
4
One person, one vote means that, if single-member districts are used, all
districts need to be relatively equal in population. 15 One person, one vote
may also be satisfied by the use of multi-member districts with varying
numbers of seats, but the number of delegates elected from such a district
would have to be proportionate to district population.'
6
B. Minority Representation and the Voting Rights Act
1. Vote Dilution
The question of minority representation is distinct from the right to equal
representation provided by the one person, one vote doctrine. Mechanisms
that respect one person, one vote can burden minority voting rights. The
clearest example of this is the at-large election. If all the members of a city
council or county commission are elected city- or county-wide, there is no
one person, one vote problem, but an at-large system can make it impossible
for a minority, which might have won some seats under a districting system,
to win any seats when all seats are filled by a jurisdiction-wide vote. 7 As the
Supreme Court has explained, "The theoretical basis for this impairment is
that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different
candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly
13. Driskell, 518 F.2d 890, 894 (5th Cir. 1975), remanded, 413 F. Supp. 974, 977 (W.D.
La. 1976), aff'd, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
14. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 726 (N.J. 1964).
15. There is little case law dealing with the election of convention delegates, so it is not
exactly clear how equal the districts must be. The Supreme Court has indicated that whereas
congressional districts within a state must be as equal as possible, state legislative districts
may deviate by as much as 16% from perfect equality when the deviation advances another
"rational" state policy, such as respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions. See Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973), amended by, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). Presumably, the state
legislative standard would apply to state convention delegates.
16. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433, 437 (1965).
17. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
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defeat the choices of minority voters."'" The same problem, known as vote
dilution, has also arisen when states use multi-member districts to elect
members of the state legislature; in such a district, one district-wide majority
can take all the seats.19 Indeed, vote dilution can also be a problem in single-
member district systems, as the districting authority can manipulate district
lines to pack minorities into some districts, or "crack" minority votes by
dispersing them into multiple districts. 20 Such single-member district
gerrymandering can also be a form of vote dilution.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court determined electoral structures that
dilute the voting strength of racial minority groups can be unconstitutional.
In White v. Regester and Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Court held that at-large
elections and multi-member districts are not per se violative of minority
voters' rights, but that they can be unlawful where, under the totality of the
circumstances, they operate to minimize or cancel out the ability of minority
voters to elect their preferred candidates.2' In City of Mobile v. Bolden,
however, the Supreme Court made it significantly more difficult to bring a
vote dilution case. Although Bolden, decided in 1980, confirmed that vote
dilution could be a form of racial voting discrimination, a plurality of the
Court determined that it would no longer use an "effects" analysis in
determining whether an electoral mechanism constituted vote dilution.23
Instead, Bolden held that to establish vote dilution a plaintiff must prove that
the electoral mechanism was adopted or maintained intentionally for the
invidious purpose of excluding minorities.24 Bolden's intent test makes
unconstitutional vote dilution very difficult to prove.
In 1982, Congress responded to Bolden by amending the Voting Rights
Act to create a statutory basis for racial vote dilution claims. Specifically,
Congress rejected the Bolden "intent" test and reinstated the prior "effects"
analysis for vote dilution claims brought under the Act. Congress rewrote
section 2 to make it clear that the Act applies to any standard, practice, or
18. Id. at 48.
19. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 673-91 (2d rev. ed. 2002).
20. Id. at 814-20.
21. White, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973), vacated by 422 U.S. 935 (1975); Whitcomb,
403 U.S. 124, 141-44 (1971).
22. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
23. Id. at 67.
24. Id. at 70.
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procedure "which results in a denial or abridgement" of the right to vote
25
and added a new subsection (b) which provides that a violation of section 2
is established
if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State
or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of
a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
26
Amended section 2, thus, makes it unlawful to use any electoral mechanism
which, under the totality of the circumstances, results in the denial or
abridgment of the right to vote of any citizen who is a member of a protected
class of racial or language minorities. Proof of discriminatory intent is
unnecessary. As the Supreme Court has explained, the "essence of a § 2
claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed
by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.
27
Section 2 rejects Bolden's "intent" test, singles out as one key factor the
extent to which minorities have been elected to office in the jurisdiction, and
rejects the idea that the Act establishes a right to proportional representation;
but it also provides no clear standard for determining when an electoral
mechanism will be found to constitute unlawful vote dilution. Instead,
relying on the vote dilution jurisprudence that had developed in the lower
courts in the decade before Bolden, Congress assumed that the courts would
assess the vote dilution question under the "totality of the circumstances."
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000) (emphasis added). The pre-1982 version of section 2
had simply applied to standards, practices, or procedures that "deny or abridge" the right to
vote, permitting the interpretation adopted in Bolden that the denial or abridgement of
minority voting rights must have been intended by those who imposed or applied the electoral
mechanism. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
27. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
[Vol. 36:11251130
2005] DELEGATES TO A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1131
2. Thornburg v. Gingles
The leading Supreme Court case construing amended section 2 is
Thornburg v. Gingles, decided in 1986, which involved a challenge by black
voters to five multi-member legislative districts in the redistricting plan of
the North Carolina General Assembly.2 8 Gingles confirmed that under
amended section 2, vote dilution could be proven by an "effects" test without
regard to intent.29 The Court held that to establish a vote dilution claim with
respect to a multi-member districting plan, a plaintiff must be able to meet
three threshold conditions.
30
First, the minority must be "sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district .... If it is not,
as would be the case in a substantially integrated district, the multi-member
form of the district cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability to
elect its candidates." 31 As the Court explained, "Unless minority voters
possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged
structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by the structure
or practice. 32 Second, "the minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive. If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it
cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts
distinctive minority group interests. 33 Third, the minority plaintiffs must be
able to demonstrate that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
3 4
Gingles gave extensive consideration to the issue of racially polarized
voting. 35 Polarized voting is central to the proof of the second and third
Gingles factors. One way of proving the necessary minority political
cohesiveness is to show that minority voters tend to vote for the same
candidates.36 Moreover, it is white bloc voting that results in the white
majority "defeat[ing] the combined strength of minority support plus white
'crossover' votes." Indeed, racially polarized voting is central to a vote
28. See id. at 34-42.
29. Id. at 66.
30. See id. at 50.
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 50 n.17.
33. Id. at 51.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 61-74.
36. Seeid. at 56.
37. Id.
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dilution claim: it is the negative synergy of racially polarized voting with
majority-enhancing devices like multi-member districts and at-large elections
that give those electoral systems their vote dilutive effects.
Gingles, however, provided "no simple doctrinal test for the existence of
legally significant racial bloc voting."38 The amount of white bloc voting that
will "minimize or cancel" black voters' ability to elect representatives of
their choice "will vary from district to district according to a number of
factors, including the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism[,]
the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive electoral devices," the
percentage of voters who are members of the minority, the size of the
district, and the number of seats to be filled.39 In short, "the degree of racial
bloc voting that is cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will
vary according to a variety of factual circumstances. ',40
Gingles rejected arguments made by the state of North Carolina that
plaintiffs must prove that race, as opposed to other factors such as
socioeconomic status or party affiliation, is the principal reason for voters'
decisions.4' According to the plurality opinion, the proper inquiry under
section 2 is whether voters of different races favor different candidates, not
why they do so. 42 As Justice Brennan explained, "It is the difference between
the choices made by blacks and whites-not the reasons for that difference-
that results in blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect their
preferred representatives. ' '43 Plaintiffs could prove voting was racially
polarized by demonstrating a substantial statistical correlation between the
race of voters and the candidates for whom they voted. 44 There was no need
to show that race "caused" voters to vote the way they did, that race was the
primary determinant in voters' choices, or that voters were motivated by
"racial hostility. '4 5 Substantial statistical differences in the voting patterns of
black and white voters, resulting in the usual defeat of candidates supported
by black voters, would suffice.46
38. Id. at 58.
39. Id. at 56.
40. Id. at 57-58.




45. Id. at 63, 67, 70-71.
46. Id. at 74.
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The Supreme Court sustained the lower court's findings of a section 2
violation with respect to four of the five districts at issue, but reversed with
respect to the fifth district because sustained black electoral success in that
district had resulted in proportional representation for black residents, and
thus, the multi-member election structure did not dilute black political
strength.47
Although Gingles dealt with multi-member districts, subsequent
Supreme Court cases have made it clear that the Voting Rights Act and the
Gingles criteria apply to the use of single-member district plans to dilute
minority votes.48
3. Totality of the Circumstances
Recent cases have emphasized that while satisfaction of the Gingles
factors is essential to judicial consideration of a vote dilution claim, proof of
the three factors does not establish vote dilution per se. Rather, courts must
determine whether, under the "totality of the circumstances," a voting
practice or procedure, such as an apportionment scheme, dilutes minority
voting rights.49 In Gingles, the Court specifically cited the Report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee that accompanied the bill amending section 2,
which elaborated on some of the circumstances that might be probative of a
potential section 2 violation and indicated that these factors are to be given
great weight in any section 2 analysis.50 These factors are:
the history of voting-related discrimination in the [jurisdiction]; the extent to
which voting in the elections of the [jurisdiction] is racially polarized; the
extent to which the jurisdiction has used voting practices or procedures that
tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, 51 and prohibitions against bullet voting;52 the exclusion of
47. Id. at 77.
48. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) ("It would be peculiar to
conclude that a vote-dilution challenge to the (more dangerous) multimember district requires
a higher threshold showing than a vote-fragmentation challenge to a single-member district.").
49. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1012 (1994).
50. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43, n.7.
51. That is, requirements that the winning candidate receive an absolute majority of all
votes cast, rather than a simple plurality.
52. That is, requirements that a voter must cast votes equivalent to the total number of
legislative seats that are to be filled. Bullet voting enables a minority group to win some at-
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent
to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in
areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle
racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
3
The Senate Judiciary Report also noted that evidence demonstrating that
elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members
of the minority group and that the policy underlying the state's or the
political subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous
may also have probative value. 4 The Report, however, stressed that this list
of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive and that there is no
requirement that any particular number of factors be proved or that a
majority of them point one way or the other. 5 Rather, the resolution of a vote
dilution claim "depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past
and present reality"' and "on a 'functional' view of the political process.,
6
4. Recent Vote Dilution Litigation
By confirming that amended section 2 imposed a "results" test, treating
racially polarized voting and the election of minority representatives as the
central "circumstances" in the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, and
holding that racially polarized voting could be proven by the statistical
correlation of voting patterns without showing that race caused those voting
patterns, Gingles facilitated minority challenges to a host of at-large systems
for electing city and county legislators and to multi-member districts for the
election of state legislators and state judges. 7 These challenges have
frequently been successful, although courts have repeatedly advised that
"[s]ection 2 contains no per se prohibitions against particular types of
districts" and that the burden is on plaintiffs to prove that the apportionment
large seats if it concentrates its vote behind a limited number of candidates and if the vote of
the majority is divided among a number of candidates. Anti-bullet voting rules would preclude
such a strategy. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 361-62.
53. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 (internal citations omitted).
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 60-61.
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scheme has the effect of denying a protected class the equal opportunity to
elect its candidate of choice. Section 2 claims have also been successfully
mounted against single-member districts plan that reduce the ability of
minorities to elect candidates.59 Moreover, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
is nationwide in scope.6° In very recent cases, courts have relied on section 2
to invalidate: the use of at-large elections to elect county governing boards in
Montana and South Carolina,61 the Boston-area single-member districts
created as part of the Massachusetts state legislative redistricting plan,62 and
the design of single-member districts used to elect members of local councils
in Albany and New Rochelle, New York; 63 and to permit a challenge to a
single district in Rhode Island's most recent state legislative
reapportionment. 64 The minority interests affected in these cases included
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.65
Of course, vote dilution plaintiffs do not always succeed, and recent
decisions have rejected vote dilution challenges to the Essex County seats in
the New Jersey Legislature;66 the redistricting of Virginia's congressional
seats;67 the use of at-large elections for county governing boards in Alabama,
Colorado, and Louisiana;68 and a single-member district plan used to elect
58. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155 (1993), vacated by 518 U.S. 1014 (1996),
aff'd, 523 U.S. 1043 (1998).
59. See Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 316 (D. Mass. 2004).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341, 353 (4th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 916 (9th Cir. 2004).
62. See Black Political Task Force, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
63. See, e.g., New Rochelle Voter Def. Fund v. City of New Rochelle, 308 F. Supp. 2d
152, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of
Albany, 281 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443, 447, 449-50, 452-53, 456 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd in part,
357 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2004).
64. See Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004).
65. See Black Political Task Force, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (African-American and
Hispanic-American voters); New Rochelle Voter Def Fund, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (African-
American and Hispanic-American voters); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (African-American, Hispanic American, and other minority
voters).
66. See Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001).
67. See Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 423, 432 (4th Cir. 2004).
68. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 376 F.3d 1260, 1264, 1269 (11th Cir.
2004); Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 594, 597-98, 601 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1017, 1040 (D. Colo. 2004).
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the governing board of a Texas county.69 As one court observed, vote
dilution cases "are among the most difficult a court must decide. Not only do
they implicate the complex relationship between race and politics, but they
also plunge courts into the uncomfortable worlds of statistical analysis and
legislative policymaking."70 Among the issues that have recently plagued the
courts have been whether a particular minority group is large enough and
compact enough to satisfy the first Gingles factor and if not, whether two
minority groups, such as African-Americans and Hispanics, are sufficiently
politically cohesive so that they may be treated as one group for purposes of
the numerosity requirement. 71 Another issue that is frequently the focus of
dispute is whether voting is racially polarized and whether polarized voting
accounts for lack of minority electoral success This has become the realm of
statistical proof and clashes between conflicting expert witnesses over the
proper method of determining the voting behavior of different racial
groups.72 Courts and experts have also divided over which elections to
consider in assessing whether voting is racially polarized and how much
weight to give to elections in which there are no minority candidates or
elections that affect the jurisdiction but are not for the office in question.73
Another fundamental difficulty is determining the significance of some
minority electoral success in deciding whether voting is polarized or whether
an electoral arrangement dilutes minority votes.74
Finally, courts have grappled inconclusively with the question of so-
called "coalition" or "influence" districts, that is, districts in which the
minority is too small to be sure of the election of its candidates of choice, but
69. See Rodriguez v. Bexar County, 385 F.3d 853, 858, 870 (5th Cir. 2004).
70. Black Political Task Force, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
71. Compare Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (African-
Americans and Hispanics are not a cohesive group), vacated, sub. nom Jackson v. Perry, 125
S. Ct. 351 (2004), with Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of
Albany, 281 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (African-Americans and Hispanics may
be combined), rev'd in part, 357 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2004). "The courts have not often allowed
minority groups to be combined," although cases go both ways, and "[w]hat is relevant is an
empirical determination of whether blacks and Hispanics consistently vote together in
elections in which minority and white candidates compete for office." BERNARD GROFMAN ET
AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 72 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1992).
72. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 770-76.
73. See, e.g., Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council v. Sundquist, 209 F.3d 835
(6th Cir. 2000); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Clinton, 687
F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
74. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74-77 (1986).
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where it may be large enough that, in cooperation with other minorities or a
substantial number of white voters, it is in a good position to influence
district elections. Recently, in Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held
that a jurisdiction may use "influence districts" defensively by arguing that
such districts can provide representation of minority interests.75 The Court
has yet to decide whether the "influence district" concept can be used
offensively, for example, to avoid the first Gingles factor by showing that
even though a minority is not large enough to dominate a district, a
jurisdiction's failure to create a minority-influence district constitutes vote
dilution. The argument has so far received a chilly reception in most of the
lower federal courts,76 although the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently
proved more receptive.77
The impact of vote dilution litigation has been affected by the doctrine
articulated by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, holding that an
excessively race-conscious districting plan violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, even if the plan does not dilute the representation of any group
of voters, minority or white.78 Shaw was a response to post-1990 state
reapportionment plans in which efforts to create majority-minority districts
in proportion to the minority's share of the state population resulted in
bizarrely-shaped districts. 79 When a minority group is not tightly clustered in
a single location, but rather is found in a number of separate places, creating
a majority-minority district may require using district lines to link these
places of minority concentration.80 Shaw indicates that not only are such
districts not required by section 2, but that they may actually be
unconstitutional.8'
5. Application to the Election of New Jersey Constitutional Convention
Delegates
75. 539 U.S. 461, 482-83 (2003).
76. See, e.g., Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 376 F.3d 1260, 1267-68 (1 1th Cir.
2004) (refusing to endorse the use of the "influence district" concept offensively); Cousin v.
Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the "influence" claim is not
permitted under the Voting Rights Act); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 943
(7th Cir. 1988) (same).
77. See Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 11 (Ist Cir. 2004) (unwilling to reject, at motion
to dismiss stage, vote dilution claim based in part on influence district theory).
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Notwithstanding the case law that suggests that the one person, one vote
requirement may not apply to the election of convention delegates, the
Voting Rights Act almost certainly applies. Section 2 broadly proscribes
denial or abridgment of the right to vote. Another section of the Act defines
the terms "vote" and "voting" to "include all action necessary to make a vote
effective in any primary, special, or general election ... for public or party
office and propositions for which votes are received in an election."
83
Although nothing in the Act refers specifically to the election of convention
delegates, the Act also makes no specific reference to any other elective
office. The Act has traditionally received an expansive construction, and it
ought to apply to any office filled by popular election, including convention
delegates.
In 1991, in Chisom v. Roemer, the Supreme Court held that section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections, even though the one
person, one vote doctrine does not.84 The Chisom Court determined that "the
word 'representatives' describes the winners of representative, popular
elections" and does not eliminate any category of elected officials. 85 The
Court's earlier decision that one person, one vote does not apply to judicial
elections did not affect the scope of section 2 since "[t]he statute was enacted
to protect voting rights that are not adequately protected by the Constitution
itself. '86 After Chisom, it has to be assumed that section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act applies to the election of constitutional convention delegates.
There has been relatively little vote dilution litigation in New Jersey.
Indeed, the only significant case is Page v. Bartels, a challenge to two of the
state legislative districts located in Essex County, created by the 2001 New
Jersey Apportionment Commission. 7 One of the districts had a white
majority.88 The other had a white plurality, although if African-American and
Hispanic voters were added together, the minority vote total was comparable
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
83. Id. § 19731(c)(1).
84. 501 U.S. 380, 402-04 (1991); see also Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Att'y Gen. of
Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 425-26, 428 (1991) (holding vote dilution doctrine under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act applies to the election of trial judges).
85. 501 U.S. at 399.
86. Id. at 403.
87. 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 352 (D.N.J. 2001). Initially, the Page plaintiffs challenged four
districts. Id. "However, during the course of the trial, it became clear" that two of the districts
"were unassailable," and the case focused on the two remaining districts, both in Essex
County. Id.
88. Id. at 357.
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to the white share of the vote.89 The court found that the African-American
and Hispanic communities in the affected districts "have common interests[,]
... work together on issues of [common] interest[s]," and "often vote as a
bloc" so that African-American and Hispanic voters could be added together
to determine whether that provided for effective minority representation.9"
The court also found there was considerable white cross-over voting for
minority candidates and thus "no evidence that the white majority in the
challenged districts vote[d] sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the
minority's preferred candidates." 91 Moreover, the court summarized the
findings of the defendant's principal expert, who analyzed the results of
every general election and some of the primary elections between 1991 and
1999 in each of the eleven districts from which minority legislators had been
elected in New Jersey, as well as from all six county-wide elections in Essex
County between 1994 and 1999, and concluded that "the vote in these
elections was not racially polarized. 92
Although these findings and the court's decision concerning the Essex
County legislative districts would have only limited effect in any potential
vote dilution challenge to any convention delegate selection plan, they do
suggest that there is no reason to assume that New Jersey elections are
characterized by white bloc voting, one of the Gingles preconditions for a
vote dilution suit.93 On the other hand, it is quite possible there is racially
polarized voting in some of the many districts not considered in the Page
litigation.
II. ALTERNATIVE VOTING SYSTEMS
The legal system's attention to the problem of minority representation
initially focused on the majority-reinforcing effects of at-large elections or
multi-member districts. One consequence of at-large elections or multi-
member districts is that they tend to submerge the interests of minorities, as
the same jurisdiction- or district-wide majority could potentially win all the
seats.94 Beginning in the 1960s, minority voting rights advocates mounted a
legal attack on the use of these arrangements to elect state legislative
89. Id.
90. Id. at 358.
91. Id. at 362.
92. Id. at 360.
93. See id.
94. See supra Part II.B.I.
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delegations or local governing bodies and sought to replace them with single-
member districts. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, voting rights
activists increasingly recognized that single-member districts are no panacea
and pose problems of their own.
95
Single-member districts can succeed as a device for providing minority
representation only when the minority is sufficiently large and sufficiently
territorially concentrated, satisfying the first Gingles factor, to constitute a
majority within a district, a so-called majority-minority district. Districting
96will be of limited benefit for small or geographically dispersed minorities.
These groups will be unable to constitute a majority in any district, and as a
result, they will be unable to prevail on a vote dilution claim, yet they may
still have concerns about the quality of their representation. For a large but
scattered minority, a majority-minority district can be created only by
manipulating district lines to pick up dispersed concentrations of minority
population and connecting them into a single district, while somehow
avoiding the non-minority populations located between the minority areas, a
practice, which when used on behalf of racial minorities, was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno.97 More generally,
single-member districts may be gerrymandered by whomever controls the
districting process in order to favor or burden particular ethnic or political
groups or individual candidates.
Single-member districts may also have perverse political effects. The
creation of a majority-minority district that is guaranteed to enable minority
voters to elect their preferred candidate may also reduce electoral
competition within the district.98 In addition, creating a majority-minority
district will reduce the number of minority voters in adjacent white districts.
This may result in the election of legislators from the white districts who are
less attentive to minority concerns. So, too, the minority representatives
elected from the majority-minority districts have had less need to be attentive
to white voters.99 This may contribute to the further racial polarization of
politics and may make it more difficult for white and minority
representatives in a legislative body to reach common ground.
95. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American
Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 418, 428-32 (1995) (book review).
96. Id. at 430.
97. 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993), rev'dby Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
98. Briffault, supra note 95, at 429-30.
99. Id. at 430.
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Finally, one benefit of at-large or multi-member representation is that it
facilitates the election of representatives who appeal to the jurisdiction as a
whole and can thus take a jurisdiction-wide perspective in the state or local
legislature. Single-member districting, by definition, fragments
representation and may make it more difficult to elect representatives who
take a broader perspective.
The growing awareness of the limitations of single-member districts,
along with Shaw v. Reno's limitation on the ability to manipulate district
lines to create majority-minority districts, have led many scholars and voting
rights advocates to turn to alternative voting systems that use multi-member
districts or at-large elections but use various voting mechanisms to prevent a
single district- or jurisdiction-wide majority from winning all the seats.
10
These systems can be used as remedies for vote dilution. But more
importantly, they can be used as devices for improving minority
representation, including the representation of political and other groups not
protected by the Voting Rights Act, even in the absence of a constitutional or
statutory violation. The three alternative voting systems that have received
significant attention are limited voting, cumulative voting, and single-
transferable or preferential voting.
A. Limited Voting
1. Description
Limited voting is a strategy for improving the ability of minorities to
elect representatives of their choice in multi-member election districts. Put
simply, limited voting restricts the number of votes a voter can cast to fewer
than the number of seats to be filled at the election.' 0 ' In an election in which
there are three seats to be filled, limited voting would limit each voter to
voting for just one or two, but not three, candidates. This can prevent the
same majority from dominating every seat and thus, will enable a large
enough and sufficiently cohesive minority to win a seat.
Under limited voting, a well-organized minority can win a seat even in
the face of well-organized majority opposition. The size necessary for the
minority to win a seat is determined by something known as the threshold of
exclusion, which, in turn, is determined by the number of seats to be filled
100. Id. at 432-41.
101. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 1141.
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and the number of votes a voter may cast. °2 In a three-member district, with
each voter limited to casting just one vote, a well-organized minority can win
a seat if the minority-preferred candidate receives one vote more than 25% of
the vote. This can be seen by considering a district with 1000 voters, one
minority candidate, and three majority candidates. The worst situation for the
minority is to be faced with a well-organized majority that spreads its
strength equally across its three candidates. Even in this situation, if the
minority's candidate can garner just 251 votes, then, with limited voting, that
candidate will win. If 251 votes go to the minority's candidate, that leaves
749 for the majority. If each majority voter is limited to one vote and if the
749-vote majority divides its strength exactly evenly among three candidates,
then two of the majority's candidates will get 250 votes apiece, and the third
will get 249. Thus, the minority candidate will squeak by. If the majority
does not divide its vote evenly and instead gives one of its candidates more
than 250 votes, then one of the majority's candidates will receive even less
than 249 votes and will clearly come in after the minority-preferred
candidate. The threshold of exclusion in a three-member district with each
voter limited to one vote is, thus, 25% + 1; a minority-preferred candidate
who receives one vote more than 25% of the total vote can be elected even in
the face of total majority opposition, provided the candidate receives
comparably unified minority support.
There is a formula for threshold of exclusion: V/(V+N) + 1, where V is
the number of votes a voter may cast and N is the number of seats to be
filled. Where there are three seats to be filled and each voter is limited to one
vote, then N=3 and V=l, the threshold of exclusion is 1/(1+3); a minority
can win a seat if it receives one vote more than 25%. Similarly, in a three-
seat district with voters limited to two votes, a well-organized minority will
win a seat if it receives 2/(2+3), or one more than 40% of the total vote. In a
fifteen-seat district, with voters limited to five votes, the threshold of
exclusion is 5/(5+15) or 25%, so that the minority would win a seat if it
received one more than 25% of the total vote. In a fifteen-seat district, with
voters limited to one vote, the minority would win a seat with a little over
1/16th of the district-wide vote or 7%.
2. History and Current Use
Limited voting has had some history in the United States. Between 1963
and 1982, ten seats on the City Council of New York City were elected on a
102. Id.
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two-per-borough basis through borough-wide limited voting. 0 3 This system
limited both the number of votes a voter could cast and the number of
candidates a party could nominate to one in each borough.10 4 This guaranteed
the election of at least five non-Democrats at a time when nearly all the
council members elected from districts were Democrats.'0 5 The New York
Court of Appeals sustained this limited voting procedure against the claim
that it violated the provision of the state constitution guaranteeing to each
qualified voter the right to vote for all officers elected from a jurisdiction.'
0 6
In so doing, the court noted that "limited voting systems almost identical in
substance with the system now under review were in effect in New York
City for many years during the 19th century in connection with the election
of supervisors and aldermen, the predecessors of councilmen."' 17 The city
council limited voting system was discontinued because of the constitutional
problem posed by giving each borough an equal number of borough-wide
representatives, despite the sharp differences in borough populations and not
because of any legal problems with limited voting.1
08
Limited voting has been used elsewhere in the United States, particularly
in Pennsylvania,' °9 Connecticut," 0 and Massachusetts."' According to one
study, Philadelphia has used this method since 1951 for its at-large council
seats, and most Pennsylvania counties, except those under home rule
charters, elect county commissioners under a limited voting system in which
a voter can vote for only two candidates for the three seats to be filled."
2
103. The use of limited voting was upheld in Blaikie v. Power, 193 N.E.2d 55, 59
(N.Y. 1963), but two decades later the federal courts struck down the allocation of two at-
large representatives per borough, despite the differences in borough population, as a violation
of one person, one vote, see generally Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd, 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982).
104. Blaikie, 193 N.E.2d at 56.
105. See Andrews, 528 F. Supp. at 251.
106. See Blaikie, 193 N.E.2d at 59.
107. Id. at 58.
108. See generally Andrews, 528 F. Supp. 246.
109. See Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (noting that voters
in elections for the Bucks County Board of County Commissioners could vote for only two
commissioners when there were three seats to be filled).
110. See LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Conn. 1972) (limited voting
for school boards).
Ill. See Latino Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston, 609 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D.
Mass. 1985) (noting use of limited voting in at-large primary elections for Boston City
Council and Boston School Committee).
112. See GROFMAN ET AL.,supra note 71, at 125.
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Limited voting has also been used in city council elections in several
Connecticut cities, in local school board elections in that state, and in local
elections in Rome, New York.'" 3 Limited voting has been used for elections
to the national legislatures in Japan and Spain. 14 In the Japanese House of
Representatives, at one time most districts were three-, four- or five-member
districts, with each voter casting one vote.' 15 In Spain, according to a study in
the 1980s, "the basic rule is that each province is a four-member district for
the election of the Senate," with each voter casting three votes.
116
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in limited voting in Voting
Rights Act litigation. Some voting rights advocates have found limited
voting within large multi-member districts to be superior to the traditional
single-member district remedy in those jurisdictions where there are
substantial minority populations but the minority is geographically dispersed
so that it is difficult to create compact predominantly minority districts." 7
Limited voting systems have been adopted as part of settlement agreements
in Voting Rights Act cases in twenty-one municipalities in Alabama." 8 One
study of fourteen of those municipalities found that the number of seats in
the local legislature was either five or seven and that the number of votes a
voter could cast was either one or two.119 Due to limited voting, African-
Americans were elected to local legislatures in communities where they
constituted 10.2%, 14.6%, 23.5%, 26.3%, 32.2%, and 38.5% of the
population. 20 Like Alabama, courts in North Carolina have also approved
113. See Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems
in the United States, in A. LIJPHART & B. GROFMAN, CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM:
ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 191, 196 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1984); see also B. GROFMAN ET
AL., supra note 7 1, at 125.
114. B. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 125.
115. See Arend Lijphart et al., The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote:
Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES 154, 156 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986).
116. Id.
117. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 1141-47.
118. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-47 (M.D. Ala. 1988)
(upholding settlement of vote dilution claims against two towns that replaced at-large
elections for town councils with limited voting plans, and noting prior approvals of limited
voting settlements in eleven other towns and pending limited voting settlements in eight more
towns).
119. See Richard L. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems as Remedies for
Minority Vote Dilution, 21 STETSON L. REV. 743, 759 tbl.4 (1992) [hereinafter Engstrom,
Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems].
120. Id. at 758-59.
1144 [Vol. 36:1125
2005] DELEGATES TO A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1145
settlements that authorize limited voting to improve minority representation
in local governments.' 2' African-Americans have been elected to county
commissions and school boards in North Carolina under limited voting
arrangements that provided for one vote per person in elections to three-
member at-large boards in jurisdictions in which blacks accounted for 31%
to 36% of the voting age population. 22 Limited voting arrangements have
also been adopted as a result of settlements of vote dilution lawsuits in





Like limited voting, cumulative voting is a device for enhancing
minority representation within the context of multi-member districts. Unlike
limited voting, in cumulative voting, each voter may cast as many votes as
there are positions to be filled. 124 But a cumulative voting system enables a
voter either to vote for candidates for all the positions to be filled or instead
to cumulate his or her votes behind those candidates he or she prefers most
intensely. 2 Typically, the only restriction on the distribution of votes among
the candidates is that the votes be cast in whole units. In a district in which
three seats are to be filled, a voter could cast three votes for one candidate;
two votes for one candidate and one vote for a second candidate; or one vote
for each of three candidates. By lifting the constraint of one vote for any
particular candidate, cumulative voting permits minority voters to cast a
more effective form of "single-shot" voting than is possible in a regular
multi-member district election. Under the usual single-shot strategy, a
group's voters cast a vote for a candidate they wish to elect, but then
withhold the rest of their votes from all the other candidates so as not to add
121. See Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't v. Cleveland County Bd. of Comm'rs, 965
F. Supp. 72, 80 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 468, (D.C. Cir. 1998); Moore v. Beaufort
County, 936 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the Fourth Circuit has determined that
cumulative voting may not be ordered by a court where the locality prefers to remedy a
Voting Rights Act violation with a single-member district plan. See McGhee v. Granville
County, 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988).
122. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems, supra note 119, at 759-60.
123. Id. at 760.
124. Briffault, supra note 95, at 432.
125. Id.
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to the vote totals of those candidates. With cumulative voting, the minority
group members need not withhold their remaining votes, but can cast them
for the candidates they prefer most intensely without contributing to the vote
totals of those candidates they prefer only weakly. Cumulative voting, thus,
allows minority voters to concentrate their votes to increase their opportunity
to elect candidates of their choice.
Like limited voting, cumulative voting relies on the threshold of
exclusion concept.126 The threshold of exclusion for cumulative voting is
1/(J+N) + 1, where N equals the number of seats to be filled. The formula is
the same as that used for limited voting, where voters are limited to just one
vote. In a three-seat district with cumulative voting, a minority's candidate
can win a seat if the minority casts one vote more than 1/(1+3)-or 250/--of
the total vote. In a district with 1000 votes, a minority with 251 votes can
win a seat even if none of the other 749 voters casts a single vote for the
minority's candidate, provided that all 251 minority voters cast all of their
votes for the minority's candidate. That candidate would receive 753 votes.
The 749 majority voters would cast 2247 votes. 128 If those votes were spread
evenly over just three candidates, no one candidate backed by the majority
would receive more than 749 votes, and the minority-preferred candidate
would squeeze by. If the majority's vote were spread over more candidates
or if the majority gave a disproportionate share of votes to one candidate,
then it would be even easier for the minority-preferred candidate to get by
the third majority-preferred candidate and win a seat.
2. History and Current Use
Cumulative voting has also had a history of use in the United States.
From 1870 to 1980, the members of the lower house of the Illinois
Legislature were elected from three-member districts through the use of
cumulative voting. 29 It was "based on a bargain between the major parties"
that enabled Republicans to be elected from Democratic areas and vice
versa.1 30 Although Illinois voters voted to keep cumulative voting in 1970, in
a separate ballot question presented as part of a referendum on a new state
126. Id. at 432 n.52.
127. See supra Part III.A. 1.
128. 749x3=2247.
129. See Weaver, supra note 113, at 198-99.
130. Id.
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constitution, they voted to abolish the cumulative voting system in 1980 as
part of a ballot measure to shrink the size of the legislature.'
3 1
As with limited voting, there has been a resurgence of interest in
cumulative voting because of the Voting Rights Act. Probably the most
important instance of the modem use of cumulative voting was its adoption
in municipal elections in Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 1987.132 Alamogordo
replaced a seven-member at-large council with four single-member districts
and three at-large seats to be elected under cumulative voting. 133 One of the
four single member districts was majority-minority, but due to the dispersion
of Hispanics who accounted for 21% of the voting age population around the
city, plaintiffs did not feel that a seven single-member district arrangement
would provide two secure minority seats. 34 In the initial election for the
three at-large seats, there were eight candidates-seven Anglos and one
Hispanic.135 The Hispanic candidate placed third in the total vote and clearly
benefited from cumulative voting: 50% of Hispanic voters reported casting
all three of their votes for her, and another 23% reported casting either one or
two votes for her.' 36 Cumulative voting has also been used to enhance
minority representation, particularly Hispanic representation, in at least
fifteen Texas municipal councils and thirty-two school boards.
137
The adoption of cumulative voting led to the election of a Native
American to the Sisseton Independent School District Board in South
Dakota. 138 About 34% of the population in the district was Native American,
but Native Americans had only rarely won elections to the at-large 
board.' 39
Following a lawsuit, the Board agreed to adopt cumulative voting, and a
Native American finished first among seven candidates contesting three
seats. 14 0 According to an exit poll, 93% of the Native Americans who voted
131. See id.




136. Id. at 753-54.
137. See Robert R. Brischetto & Richard L. Engstrom, Cumulative Voting and Latino
Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen Texas Communities, 78 SOC. Sci. Q. 973, 974-75
(1997).
138. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems, supra note 119, at 754.
139. Id.
140. Id.
RUTGERS LA W JOURNAL
cast all three votes for the Native American candidate who won, despite
receiving only 14% of votes cast by whites.
14 1
Cumulative voting was also adopted, again as part of a settlement to a
vote dilution lawsuit, by five local governments in Alabama. 42 "Despite
having African American populations that ranged from only 10.3% to 11.9%,
an African American was elected for the first time to the governing board in
each of these jurisdictions under cumulative voting rules.''143 Cumulative
voting also enabled African-Americans to win one of five at-large city
council seats in Peoria, Illinois, where they constituted 20.9% of the
population.' 44 Efforts by several federal district courts to impose cumulative
voting on local government, however, were eventually reversed by the courts
of appeals either because there was no underlying Voting Rights Act
violation or because the district court lacked authority to reject the local
government's proposed single-member district remedy. 1
45
3. Cumulative Voting and Limited Voting Compared
Cumulative voting differs from limited voting in two ways. On the one
hand, it may be slightly superior to limited voting in the sense that no voter is
deprived of the opportunity to vote for a separate candidate for each seat to
be filled; rather, cumulative voting gives voters the choice of either voting
for a candidate for each seat to be filled or voting strategically to maximize
the chances of success of the most intensely preferred candidate. On the
other hand, cumulative voting is slightly more complex than limited voting.
Voters would have to be instructed that they may cast multiple votes for the
same candidate, and voting machines would have to be modified
141. Id. at 754-55; see also Richard L. Engstrom & Charles J. Barrilleaux, Native
Americans and Cumulative Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 Soc. Scl. Q. 388, 391
(1991).
142. See Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 876 (M.D. Ala.
1988) (upholding settlements of vote dilution lawsuits that provided for cumulative voting in
elections to the county commission and board of education, and noting approval of cumulative
voting as settlement in another Alabama case and two pending settlement proposals).
143. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat Election Systems, supra note 119, at 756.
144. Id.; see also Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Cumulative Voting and Minority
Candidates: An Analysis of the 1991 Peoria City Council Elections, 17 AM. REV. POL. 225,
227 (1996).
145. See McCoy v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2000);
Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1998); Cane v. Worcester County, Maryland,
35 F.3d 921, 929 (4th Cir. 1994), affd in part, vacated in part, 57 F.3d 1065 (4th Cir. 1995).
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accordingly.' 46  Critics have expressed concern about the possible
complexity, but evidence from the jurisdictions using cumulative voting
suggests that the complexity concern has been overstated.
47
C. Single Transferable Voting/Preference Voting
1. Description
Single Transferable Voting ("STV") is a preference voting system.' 48
Each voter is provided with a single vote, but is allowed to rank order
candidates to reflect his or her relative preferences among them.,
49 Ranking
candidates in order of preference enables votes that would be "wasted" on
one candidate to be transferred to another candidate. ° Votes can be
"wasted" if they are "surplus" votes for a candidate who would win without
that vote, or if they are cast in support of a losing candidate. 15 STV saves
wasted votes by providing for the transfer of the vote to the next ranked
candidate on a voter's ballot. 52 STV, thus, increases the proportion of voters
in an election whose vote will ultimately contribute to the election of a
candidate. 1 3 This benefits electoral minorities whose votes would otherwise
be "wasted" on losing candidates.
The winning candidates in an STV election are those whose votes equal
or exceed a specified number.'54 This number is based on the "Droop quota,"
the quotient obtained when the total number of ballots cast is divided by the
number of seats to be filled, plus one.155 The formula is: V/(N+J) + 1, where
146. See Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United
States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 270-72 (describing organized educational efforts used to
explain a new cumulative voting system to voters in Chilton County, Alabama).
147. See Richard L. Engstrom & Robert R. Brischetto, Cumulative Voting Too
Complex? Evidence from Exit Polls, 27 STETSON L. REV. 813, 826 (1998); see also Pildes &
Donoghue, supra note 146, at 284-85 (suggesting that any voter confusion diminishes over
time and has not affected turnout).
148. Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for










V is to total number of votes cast, and N is the number of seats to be filled. 56
This is the lowest possible number of votes that can be required for election
and yet limit the number of individuals elected to the number of seats to be
filled.
157
If there are three seats to be filled, and 1000 votes have been cast, the
Droop quotient is 1000/(3+1) + 1, or 251.158 In an STV election, a candidate
who gets 251 first-place votes is automatically elected. If a candidate meets
the quota on the first ballot, then the candidate's "surplus" votes are
redistributed to the second choices named by those voters, and a new set of
vote totals is determined.5 9 If no candidate receives the quota on the first
count, the last place candidate is eliminated, his or her votes are transferred
to the next ranked candidates on these ballots, and a new set of vote totals is
determined.
160
Transferring the votes of losing candidates is straightforward. 16' All of
the ballots of an eliminated candidate are simply transferred to the voters'
next choices.' 62 The transfer of the surplus votes of winning candidates is
more complicated, and several methods are used. 6 3 One is simply to declare
a candidate elected once his or her vote total matches the quota and to treat
all remaining ballots as surplus. 64 A second method, used in Ireland where
STV is the basic election system, is to select a number equal to the surplus
randomly from among the winning candidate's ballots. 6 A third method,
"probably the preferable one now that computers can be used to count
votes," is to redistribute a winning candidate's surplus votes according to the
proportion of the total ballots allocated to the winning candidate on which
each respective other candidate has been identified as the next choice. 66
STV offers a group united behind a candidate the same opportunity to
elect that candidate as does a one-vote limited voting system or cumulative
voting. The Droop quota functions as a threshold of exclusion for STV,
156. Id.
157. Id.





163. See id. at 789-90.
164. Id. at 789.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 789-90.
167. Id. at 790.
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and it generates the same threshold as a cumulative voting or one-vote
limited voting system.'6 An organized "25% + 1" minority can win one seat
in a three-seat jurisdiction under all three systems.
69
"STV, however, has a distinct advantage over these other systems in that
it can better accommodate intra-group competition.' 70 In a limited voting or
cumulative voting election, as well as in a majority-minority single-member
district, a dispersion of the minority vote across two or more minority-
preferred candidates could be fatal to the election of any minority-preferred
candidate.' 7' Minority voters would have to be tightly coordinated behind a
single candidate. In practice, this may be difficult to achieve. Under STV,
however, there can be intra-group competition without canceling out the
group's opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice.'72
For example, assume an election with 1000 voters, 300 minority voters
and 700 majority voters; three seats to be filled; and two minority-preferred
candidates and three majority-preferred candidates. Assume also that the
majority votes only for majority-preferred candidates; that it spreads its first
place votes evenly, 233 or 234 per candidate; and that the majority voters'
subsequent preferences are only for majority candidates. Assume that the
minority voters split 170 first-place votes for candidate A and 130 first-place
votes for candidate B and that voters for B list A as their second choice.
In order to win, a candidate needs a Droop quota that is 1000 (total
votes)/[3 (total seats) +1] + 1, or 251 votes. On the first count, candidate B
would be eliminated. But B's voters would have listed A as their second
choice, and on the second round B's votes go to A, giving him 300 and a seat.
Subsequently, the weakest majority candidate would be eliminated, and the
other two majority representatives elected.
In effect, STV can function as both a primary election and a general
election simultaneously, with voters registering both their most intense
preference and their second and more choices who may have a better chance
of election. 7 3 Under STV, voters can also cross group lines, perhaps naming
as their first choice a member of their own racial or ethnic group, but also
listing members of other groups as lower-ranked choices, thus giving them
an opportunity to support their own group's candidate and also, once their
168. Id.
169. See id. at 790-91.
170. Id. at 791.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 806-07.
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candidate has either clearly won or clearly lost, giving support to the most
attractive candidates of other groups. This may also encourage candidates to
appeal across group lines for the second- or third-place votes of members of
another group since those votes might enable such candidates to win seats
without undercutting the principal choices of the other group. Indeed,
candidates from different groups might seek to run together.
2. History and Current Use
Approximately, two dozen cities adopted STV for elections to city
councils in the period between 1917 and 1950, although only Cambridge,
Massachusetts, uses the system today. 174 STV was used for the election of
the nine-member city council in Cincinnati, Ohio, from 1924 to 1957, and
there have been efforts to restore STV in Cincinnati. 175 STV was used in the
election of New York City community school board members. 76 In the last
several years, there have been efforts to adopt STV in local elections in
several cities in Minnesota, including Minneapolis.'77 San Francisco recently
adopted a version of STV, known as instant run-off voting, for elections to
its board of supervisors. 178 STV is used for all public elections in the
Republic of Ireland and for the election of the upper house of Parliament and
for some provincial elections in Australia.
179
3. Preferential Voting Compared with Limited and Cumulative Voting
One great advantage of STV over cumulative and limited voting is that it
permits intra-group disagreement without forfeiting minority group
strength.' 80 STV gives voters more choices than does limited voting: an STV
voter has just one first-place choice but can rank the order of as many
174. Id. at 795 n.3 1.
175. See id. at 792-806.
176. See DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 137-38 (1993).
177. Tony Anderson Solgard & Paul Landskroener, Municipal Voting Reform:
Overcoming the Legal Obstacles, 59 BENCH & B. MINN. 16, 18 (2002).
178. See Kimberly Edds, For Voters, Choice Is As Easy As 1, 2, 3; San Francisco
Adopts Ranked Balloting, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A3; Dean E. Murphy, New Runoff
System in San Francisco Has the Rival Candidates Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004,
at Al 6.
179. See Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote, supra note 148, at 792 n.2 1.
180. See text accompanying supra note 172.
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second-, third-, fourth-place, etc., candidates as there are seats to be filled.
And unlike cumulative voting, there is no risk of "wasting" votes, that is, of
voters unnecessarily giving a candidate "surplus" votes, since those votes can
be counted towards a voter's second choice candidate once the first-choice
candidate is elected. Moreover, unlike limited and cumulative voting, which
encourage voters to concentrate on their top choices and either eliminate or
discourage voting for other candidates, STV enables voters to vote for as
many candidates as there are seats, without frustrating the voters' ability to
give priority to a first-choice candidate. STV can also reduce polarization
and encourage candidates to campaign for votes outside their primary
constituency because with STV a candidate can say to a group of voters, "I
know candidate A is your first choice, but please give me your second place
votes."
STV also has one great drawback: it is a relatively complicated system.
Voters have to be instructed concerning the opportunity to cast rank-order
preference votes and the voting technology has to be modified accordingly.
STV is also a relatively uncommon system and might be considered "exotic"
by the voters.
D. Single-Member Districts and Alternative Systems Compared
Single-member districts have many advantages. For any given number of
representatives in a legislature or delegates to a convention, a single-member
district will be smaller than a multi-member district.181 Small size allows
constituents greater access to their representatives (and vice versa). It also
"allows for the possibility of greater delineation of geographical interest, and
can facilitate grass-roots political movements."' 2 Similarly, because they are
smaller, single-member districts are also likely to be cheaper to campaign in,
so that campaign finance costs will pose a lower barrier to entry than in
multi-member districts. 183 To the extent that the distinctive interests in a state
are territorially- or geographically-based, single-member districts facilitate
the representation of such territorial or geographic communities. 84 Indeed,
single-member districts are very effective at providing representation for
large, territorially concentrated groups. Moreover, "single member districts,
181. Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting
Systems in the United States, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1119, 1140 (1998).
182. Id.
183. Seeid. at 1141.
184. Id.
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if properly drawn, offer the voter the advantages of election simplicity,
understandability, and, perhaps, a sense of community .... How the ballots
are counted, and how a winner is determined are clear."
'' 85
Single-member districts also have significant disadvantages. First,
minorities, whether ethnic, political, or other, that are territorially dispersed
will find it difficult to form a majority in any one district and thus may be
unable to win effective representation. 86 Second, district lines are subject to
manipulation or "gerrymandering," so that the resulting districts may not
provide for fair representation of the entire state or locality.'87 In either
scenario, single-member districts may promote both noncompetitive contests
within districts and polarization within a legislature. If, whether due to
gerrymandering or the territorial concentrations of particular groups of
voters, a district is dominated by one ethnic group or party, then elections
within that district may be one-sided, and the representatives elected may see
their role as primarily representing the distinctive views of their districts. In
multi-member districts and at-large elections, candidates have a greater
incentive to appeal to and to think about the interests of the entire
jurisdiction.
The fundamental problem with at-large elections or multi-member
districts-potential overrepresentation of the majority because the majority
may win all seats in a jurisdiction--can be cured by one of the alternative
voting systems. Indeed, alternative voting systems can be quite effective at
providing for minority representation, particularly the representation of non-
territorial minorities. However, like all multi-member systems, they produce
larger districts and may provide reduced representation for geographic
interests.
Although one advantage of the use of an alternative voting system is that
it reduces the significance of districting, and thus the consequences of
gerrymandering, some districting is still likely to be required for a statewide
election. It seems unlikely that a state like New Jersey would want to elect an
entire constitutional convention on a statewide basis. That would provide no
representation of geographic interests and would lead to very costly delegate
election campaigns. Moreover, on the assumption that the convention would
be at least as large as the upper house of the legislature, that is forty
members, any voting plan other than a very tightly restricted limited voting
185. Id. at 1142.
186. See id. at l147.
187. Id. at 1143.
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system would force voters to evaluate and vote for a very large number of
candidates.
Thus, an alternative voting plan would most likely involve some use of
multi-member districts, with some delegates also possibly elected statewide
at-large. Limited voting, cumulative voting, or STV could then be used to
limit the power of district-level majorities. One possibility would be to elect
convention delegates from existing state senate or assembly districts, but
instead of electing one delegate per district, elect three or four.'"8 This has
the advantage of using district lines that already satisfy one person, one vote,
and have survived a vote dilution challenge, albeit one focused only on Essex
County. 89 Turning these districts into multi-member districts subject to an
alternative voting mechanism would permit continuing representation of the
territorial interests currently represented, while enabling better representation
of the racial, ethnic, and political minorities within the current districts.
Of course, there would remain other issues-not only the number of
representatives per district and which particular voting system, but also the
appropriate threshold of exclusion. For example, in a four-member district
under a limited voting plan, each voter could be limited to one, two or three
votes. The fewer votes a voter has, the lower the threshold of exclusion.
Similarly, in a cumulative voting system, each voter could be allowed to
cumulate all her votes, or just some of them. That would also affect the
threshold of exclusion. For an STV system, the number of seats effectively
determines the threshold of exclusion; the more seats there are per district,
the better chance a minority has of winning a seat.
Any plan involves trade-offs and presents issues. Single-member
districts provide simplicity, familiarity, smaller constituencies, and
geographic representation. But they are weaker at representing smaller, non-
territorial minorities and interests that cross geographic lines and the district
lines are subject to manipulation. Multi-member districts with an alternative
voting rule are more complex, unfamiliar, and use larger units; but they can
better represent smaller, non-territorial minorities and non-geographic
interests. Permutations of different alternative voting plans have different
implications for the degree of minority representation within a district and
188. The New York State Constitution provides for a constitutional convention
composed of fifteen delegates elected state-wide plus three delegates elected from each of the
state's sixty-two senate districts. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
189. See Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001); see also supra
notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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within a state as a whole. Ultimately, the voting rules chosen can affect the
process for selecting delegates and the composition of the convention.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its report, the New Jersey Property Tax Convention Task Force made
two recommendations, each receiving the support of roughly one-half the
Task Force's members. 190 Under the first proposal, there would be eighty
elected delegates, composed of two delegates from each of the state's forty
legislative districts, plus an additional ten delegates appointed by the
Governor and the leaders of the Legislature.' 9' Specifically, the Governor
would appoint two delegates, and the President and Minority Leader of the
Senate and the Speaker and Minority Leader of the Assembly would also
each appoint two delegates "to provide demographic diversity.' 92 Under the
second proposal, there would be 120 elected delegates, composed of three
delegates from each legislative district.'
93
Although the report is not clear on this point, the implication in both
proposals is that the delegates would be elected district-wide at-large, with
the two candidates receiving the most votes elected, and each voter permitted
to vote for as many candidates as there are seats to be filled-for example,
two per district in the first proposal and three in the second. That inference is
bolstered by the constitutional convention bill passed by the Assembly in
May 2005, which embraced the first proposal and clearly stated that voters
could vote for two candidates and that the two candidates receiving the most
votes in each district would be elected.' 9
190. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 8. Task Force member Assemblyman Kevin J. O'Toole did not support
either proposal. Id. at 8 n.3. Instead, Assemblyman O'Toole recommended 120 elected
delegates, composed of three from each legislative district, but allocated so that one
Republican, one Democrat and one independent/unaffiliated candidate would be elected from
each district. Id.
194. See Assemb. 5269, 211th Leg. §§ 15-16 (N.J. 2005). This inference is also
supported by Task Force member Assemblyman O'Toole's dissent, which explicitly called for
electing not the top three vote-getters, but the top Republican, the top Democrat, and the top
independent, implying that under the Task Force's recommendation the top three vote-getters
regardless of party (and permitting three of the same party per district) would be elected. See
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8 n.3.
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With delegates under both plans elected district-wide at-large and each
voter getting to vote for as many candidates as there are delegates to be
elected, the first proposal, which was adopted by the Assembly, seems
superior. District-wide at-large elections raise the prospect of over-
representing local majorities and under-representing local minority interests.
In effect, each seat becomes the basis of a majority-minority election. A
significant minority may win a considerable number of votes, but still lose
each seat. Electing three-members at-large may carry the majority-
reinforcing potential even further than electing two-members at-large. The
provision for ten appointed members with attention to "this State's
demographic diversity and the degree to which that diversity is represented
by the delegates elected to the convention"' 95 takes some of the edge off the
majority-reinforcing tendency of the district elections. Moreover, the
appointments process provides some opportunity for the selection of
delegates, or the representation of groups, not tied to local geography and
better capable of addressing state-wide concerns.
On the other hand, even the first proposal, which the Assembly adopted,
can be seen as flawed in its reliance on district-wide elections with each
voter getting to vote for two candidates. It is reasonable for the Legislature to
rely on existing legislative districts in the selection of delegates, since voters
may be familiar with the districts, which have been functioning as political
communities. But at-large elections tend to over-represent local majorities
and make it more difficult for local minorities to win representation. The
election of two or three delegates from a district would have provided an
excellent opportunity to use the limited voting or cumulative voting
mechanisms discussed in this Article. Perhaps the next time the question of a
constitutional convention arises, whether in New Jersey or elsewhere, the
legislature, or any other body responsible for setting up the convention's
ground rules will take those options more seriously.
195. Assemb. 5269, 211 th Leg., § 17.
